As discussed above, World War II was the last war of the Industrial Revolution and the first war of Applied Science. Masses of men and equipment fought masses of men and equipment and 50 million casualties resulted. But the decisive edge came in the area of technological advances: radar and electronics; jet engines and air power; ballistic missiles and guided weapons; and nuclear bombs. The main features of the Technological War were established. The demands for security and defense became the engine for refinements and improvements of the World War II Applied Science. As advances led advances, the pace of technological change accelerated and produced a new dimension in international conflict -- Technological War.
But the strategy for directing and applying the change lagged far behind. The arsenal concept gave way to the military/industrial/scientific team commanded by General Eisenhower in l946 when he was Chief of Staff of the Army. For the first decade of the Post-War period, leaders chosen to run the team came from the industrial sector. The individuals who became Secretaries of Defense had demonstrated ability to "manage" large industrial complexes. They were not technological leaders, let alone innovators. As the civilians to whom the military were subordinate, they had three broad elements of technology to lead in the war: proof of application, advanced development, and systems.
In the first decade of the Technological War, the Secretaries of Defense were individuals from large corporations whose knowledge and experience was confined to production of the hardware which comprises weapons systems. They had no experience or understanding of the process of conducting proof of application and very limited experience in prototyping. They had no firsthand experience with the technological base, especially science where new principles are discovered and proof of principle tests are performed.
In the succeeding two decades, the Secretaries of Defense were chosen from the Establishment. They had "good working relations with Congress," or they had started in the world of science and had gone into the Defense Department and gained experience in how to "manage" the bureaucracy.
One startling fact emerges. Not one of them had made a scientific discovery or conducted a proof of principle in defense; air designs, or produced a weapon systems. In other words, they had not been technological leaders.
Technological leaders were from the military services who led, directed, managed the program offices which either were program integrators or which directed the industrial team members who were integrators and producers. Similarly, members of the military services were responsible for the engineering efforts for prototyping and proof of application. Most of the innovations at this phase of technology resulted from the efforts of individual engineers or scientists or a small team of such skilled individuals. And the basic advances came from scientists in academia, research laboratories of industry, or the scientific laboratories of the services.
Overseeing the complex effort were civilians from industry or scientific laboratories. The Peter Principle applied to their cases meant they could never be the real Technological leader, the Secretary of Defense. This rule in turn has changed over the past decades of Technological War. Congress made itself the Technological Leader by its veto power over the budget. It delayed, prevented, and at times eliminated technological efforts but it never innovated, invented, or created a new technology. How could a committee of 500 possibly do so?
In theory, the Congress reflects the will of its voters, but that theory disappeared with the gerrymandering of the Democratic controlled state legislatures. Election has become a lifetime sinecure. Reflecting what is interpreted to be the public mood, the Congress has consistently tried to constrain the defense budget and thus the technological effort. They also reflect the influence of the media and part of the intellectual community who advocate constraints on technology under the ideology that such constraints make war less likely, or defense expenditures decrease, or both. The history of the Technological War to date demonstrates the opposite. Treaties and other constraints on technology increase costs.
Returning, thus, to our analogy of the stream of technology, we see the following. At the level of discovery and proof of principle, application, and production we see individuals and groups swimming vigorously with the current. At the decision and control level in the Department of Defense, we see others in the stream who are drifting along. In the Congress we have those who want to get out of the stream and sit on the banks. Finally, we have those who are trying ineffectively to dam up the stream.
Surveying the history of the Technological War, one could say that the result of meddling through for the past decades has been that the U.S. is not only the world leader in technology, it is the only technological giant. That answer is not adequate for the future. As our trade has become global, so has our technology. As a matter of policy we gave Europe and Japan space capabilities. We rebuilt their computer industries. We watched the world become innovators in electronics, computers, an "expert systems". The Technological War includes not only security and defense; it includes also commerce, industry, and the next frontier -- space.
We have many scientific and industrial organizations which do periodic one time assessments of technology. The National Science Foundation, The National Academy of Science, the Defense Science Board, the list is long. But then our activities are not directed or interpreted. They can be. The key element is technological leadership.
From idea to concept to proof of principle to proof of application to production to application is a continuum. As a result of efforts to constrain costs the continuum of technology has been divided into budget packages, in theory to make the programs "more manageable" but in reality to simplify accounting to Congress. There is some utility to this approach that flows from the characteristics of the individuals who work in various phases of the continuum. Scientists who make innovations do not lead production of hardware. Engineers who lead such production do not devote their lives to scientific discoveries. These special skills are transferable within the phases of the continuum but cannot be applied from beginning to end.
What is the role of the technological leader and strategists? He leads the effort through the continuum, applying the characteristic skills to the appropriate phase. He can do that because the efforts during the continuum at the production phase are directed to goals. And these goals are identified and realized principally through a process of strategic analysis.
The first step is to establish responsibility at the national level. That should take the form of a new cabinet position of Secretary of Technology. We recognize the workings of the Peter Principle that such a step could be a reflection of the fact that the U.S. could have reached its peak in technology and is on the decline technologically. We do not believe so.
We are still in the phase of the Technological War wherein the lead in technology is essential to national defense. But the war has taken on new dimensions encompassing commercial and trade activities, and will soon extend into space. Former military allies are now formidable technological adversaries. Creation of a cabinet post will recognize the reality that technology pervades all aspects of our national life and our position in international affairs as well.
The Secretary of Technology would be responsible for policy guidelines to many organizations, groups, and associations at the national level, such as the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Engineering, on strategic assessment, trends, and avoidance of technological surprise. He would lead in strategic assessment of the U.S. position in technology and in emerging new frontiers. He would stimulate development of facilities for advanced research and development. He would be a leading advocate of education in science, research, and engineering.
There have been efforts in the past to conduct net assessment of the U.S. position and of net technological assessment of the state of U.S. technology for defense. These efforts should be expanded and led by the Secretary of Technology.
In addition, he should be responsible for periodic evaluation of technological opportunities such as were made in "New Horizons," "Forecast I," "New Horizons II," and "Forecast II."
An important element of his office should be his Board of Technological Advisors. The Office of the President's Science Advisor and Office of Science and Technological Policy have been partial steps toward presidential level advice. The Department of Defense has had science boards and scientific advisors. They should continue but be harmonized at the national level to implement the strategy of technology.
As discussed above, the focus should not be on procurement of hardware or on acquisition of systems, it should be on the continuum from idea to application by the ultimate users.