(Jerry, I didn't have time to put the idea on my Mac. I did this on the airplane. It gives some structures to Chapter 2. There are others: Lasers, ElF comm, ICBM basing (the Dirty Thirty).
P.S. A conclusion we can draw is that some technologies, and the postwar period is dominated by two: electronics and computers, find infinite commercial applications and their pace exceeds that of the military. The latter have trouble implementing the innovations because they are constrained by Congress and their bureaucratic specs from applying them.
P.P.S. Note that the US long-range bomber program has rendered the power strategy of ever higher, ever faster for survivability. The B-l and B-2 depend on ECM and Stealth for survivability.
As far as civil air, the trend is the same -- sub-sonic, but emphasis on fuel efficiency and quieter engine. There are market and social constraints. (The Air Force has been excepting supersonic, inefficient fighters for years.)
Most examples (ballistic missiles; ASAT's; BMP; military uses of space), show you can't constrain technology. Others (computers, electronics) show that you have to swim like hell to stay in the mainstream. Others (GPS, TFX, Shuttle) show it is almost impossible in the present procurement environment to have programs for one or more service. The NASA/DOD case of different management philosophies and ideologies (peace and security) don't work well. Add your own.
(Jerry: See enclosed charts)
l) End of arsenal: Start of Science, Industry, Military team a la Ike.
2) Technological innovations and transfer.
a) Atomic Bomb - Nuclear Technology; Weapons; Propulsion; Electrical Power; See Chap.?; Nuclear Powered Airplane -- nuclear powered subs forced on Navy by Hymie.
3) Aviation to Airpower: Aerodynamics.
a) Straight wing to swept to delta. German facilities and experience -- wind tunnels, test data and technology. Breaking the sound barrier to supersonic flight.
b) Second Generation -- variable geometry from low MACH to high MACH.
Error trying to constrain a new technology for reasons of cost. Lesson not learned -- Joint Service procurements. No STS -- why? Cast/off trades TFX, Ballistic missiles.
c) Third Generation -- hypersonic flight -- still not here. See Aerospace Plane.
4) Radio to Radar to Electronics to Avionics. Straight line, low key incremental evolutionary advances spurred by germanium chips, micro-miniaturization. Some glitches in McNamara era: P based array radar: Phased array radar, E early Warning Satellite. Johnny Foster did it in spite of MacNamara.
5) Ballistic Missiles -- constrained by ideology of scientists. V. Bush et al..
a) Crash reaction to Soviet ICBM and Sputnik . Success story in ICBM and Polaris. Part of success is in working outside the bureaucracy.
d) Adaptation to Space. Defeat of Van Braun arsenal approach at Huntsville.
l) Arsenal error repeated in NASA. Bureaucracy cannot design, produce and applicate systems using high tech. Faze out commercial applications by focusing on technological showcases for "peaceful purposes."
e) Era of computational Plenty. (GPS story) Thrust on military by slow recognition of commercial applications.
l) Slow reaction of bureaucracy to cutting costs through applications of commercial practices and standards. 2) Military recover through AI and Ada.
d) Strategic missile guidance, product of electronics revolution. Improvements constrained by Congress for faulty (stupid) strategic concepts.
l) ASAT's -- do we need them to deter Soviets from attacking our satellites?
Answers:
a) It doesn't matter if they are ahead of us in ASAT's. They'll never work and they won't use them.
b) We have more to lose in an ASAT race than the Soviets do.
c) If we give them to the CINC's, they'll use them in war-fighting.
2) BMD. Why build it?
a) MAD means the Soviets will never attack.
b) If we deploy BMD, the world will become unstable (Implication -- Soviets will attack us if we deploy. Obviously logic is counter to a.).
c) BMD won't work
d) It costs too much.
e) Services don't want it. there won't be any nuclear war and we need the money for World War II not III.
3) New Approach -- Our approach -- Competitive Strategy. Apply our technological strengths to defeat Soviet weaknesses. JCS and Services oppose. Challenges pet programs -- more carriers, more tanks, more fighters. Service answers -- Just keep on doing what we're doing.
4) Low-intensity conflict, small war. JCS and Services don't want it. Interferes with the "big war." Who wants to fight that kind of war anyway?
l) Natural aerospace plane. Who needs that but "fat cats" and profiteering businessmen going to and from Asia?
2) The Incredible Shrinking Space Station. The NASA arsenal wins; the US loses a needed space capability.
3) Low cost boosters -- countercost.
4) Low cost satellites -- If we give them to the CINC's, our "spooks" are threatened.
5) Robotics -- do we want on the battlefield in airplanes, tanks, and trucks?
6) Stealth -- Is it here to stay? Anti-stealth technology already in the lab.
No strategy of technology.
No principles for application of technology.
No grasp of management principles proven in successful programs: ICBM and SLBM.
No leader of technological war. Secretary of Defense doesn't qualify -- Louie Johnson, Wilson, the man from P &; G, MacNamara, etc.
Congress can't lead -- Nunn, Aspin, etc.
And Packard abolished DARPA over Schriver's objections.
DARPA is not the answer. It develops prototypes that the Services won't accept.
Arms control is not the answer. Impossible to constrain technology through policy. Impossible to contain Soviet strategic force modernization through treaty.
Types Numbers
l950 l960 l970 l980 l990 2000
ICBM's SS-9, SS-4, SS-l8 SS-24 SSBX
SS-l3, SS-l7 SS-l9 SS-25 SSBY
SLBMS's SSN-3 SS-N-l8 SSN-24
SSN-6 etc. SSn-23